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  Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University.  Deep thanks to Professors Sunstein and Miles for sharing their1
draft with me in time to permit this response, and to the editors of the Chicago Law Review for agreeing to print it in the
same issue.
  Cf. Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation – in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.Chi.L.Rev. 800,2
817 (1983)(“[T]he irresponsible judge will twist any approach to yield the outcomes that he desires and the stupid judge
will do the same thing unconsciously.  If you assume a judge who will try with the aid of a reasonable intelligence to put
himself in the place of the enacting legislators, then I believe he will do better if he follows my suggested approach.”)
  Roscoe Pound, Economic Interpretation and the Law of Torts, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 365, 366-67, 382 (1940).3
  467 U.S. 837 (1984).4
  463 U.S. 29 (1983).5
  [If you think you need a footnote, I don’t, I’d suggest Crowell v. Benson and United States v. Grimaud]6
  [Again, I’d prefer minimal footnoting; but you could, if you think you must, use Strauss, the Place of7
(continued...)
Overseers or “The Deciders” – The Courts in Administrative Law
Peter L. Strauss1
For the second time in a short period, Professors Sunstein and Miles have brought powerful tools
of statistical analysis and diligent coding of court of appeals opinions together to demonstrate what
the Realists long ago taught us to suspect, that significant elements of judging can be explained in
terms of the jurist’s political world view – that the tension between law and politics is alive in
judicial work as elsewhere, and that it is only an aspiration to seek a world “of laws and not of men.”
Elements of their work, though, appear as if in criticism of contemporary doctrine rather than
confirmation of human nature. Without for a moment wishing to deny that we are better served by
judges who do not permit themselves the freedom to enact personal politics,  that the “tenacity” of2
a taught tradition”  and appropriately framed legal propositions purporting to constrain such3
preferences serve us well, I want to suggest that in targeting two notable Supreme Court cases each
approaching its silver anniversary (Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.4
and Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. ) they may mistake the context5
in which the inevitable presently appears for its cause.  The issues these cases address are not new.
And the cases establish a more reasonable framework for appropriate relationship between executive
and judicial action than Professors Sunstein and Miles suggest.
I. A Framework for the Court-Agency Relationship
For many decades, Congress has been assigning the authority to act with the force of law – to
create legally binding, statute-like texts and/or to decide “cases” that it might have assigned to the
judiciary – to executive authorities rather than exercise it completely itself, or confer the task on the
courts.   Problematic only at the fringes, these delegations of authority are generally accepted as6
valid, at least so long as they reserve appropriate relationships between those to whom the authority
is delegated and the named authorities of constitutional government.   For present purposes that7
  (...continued)7
Agencies, 84 Columbia; Whitman v. Am Trucking Assn; I will stop pointing to the unnecessary (in my judgment) here.]
  5 U.S.C. 706(2) [I’d be happy for you to include its text, and then cite to it as appropriate in what follows.]8
  323 U.S. 124 (1944)9
  Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933); United States v. American10
Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543, 549 (1940)(Compare “The interpretation of the meaning of statutes, as applied to
justiciable controversies, is exclusively a judicial function” (emphasis supplied) with “In any case [responsible agency]
interpretations are entitled to great weight.  This is peculiarly true here where the interpretations involve
‘contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion,
of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.’[Citing Norwegian Nitrogen.]
Furthermore, the Commission's interpretation gains much persuasiveness from the fact that it was the Commission which
suggested the provisions' enactment to Congress. 
relationship is the relationship between agencies and courts.  Courts and Congress have been
speaking to the character of this relationship from the moment of its emergence – Congress’s chief,
but not exclusive, present statement may be found in Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure
Act;  the Courts’, in a series of cases interpreting that Act or (as in Chevron) indicating its8
understanding of Congress’s purposes in making delegations.  A common problem is that for some
issues, courts are entitled to be the deciders – influenced by agency view, perhaps, but nonetheless
themselves independently responsible for the conclusions reached.  For other issues, the conclusion
that Congress has validly delegated authority to the agency carries with it the corollary that the
agency is responsible for decision, and the court’s function is limited to oversight.  Telling the two
apart, and then securing judicial recognition of its subordinate role in the oversight context, has been
a constant challenge.  It is not made easier by recognition that the intensity of the court’s supervisory
role varies with context.  Still, acceptance of the proposition that for some issues courts are
ultimately responsible, and for others agencies are, is central.
A.  Telling the Two Apart
Chevron’s notorious two-step analysis is perhaps best understood as separating those elements
of the judicial relationship to agency action that are appropriate for independent judicial judgment,
from those for which the judicial role is constrained to oversight.  The courts have emphasized, and
Section 706 reaffirms, that determining questions of law is a matter for independent judicial
judgment.  However, two further propositions, that might be thought qualifications of this statement,
also may be stated.
• In reaching that independent conclusion, a court might find reason to assign some weight to
a responsible agency’s judgment about the matter.  This is a proposition most strongly
associated with Justice Jackson’s 1944 opinion in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,  but it is made9
explicit in earlier decisions  as well.10
• The court’s independent conclusion of law might be that authority over some particular
question of meaning (now often reframed as one of “policy” rather than “law”)  has been
validly assigned to an administrative agency; in such a context, it is merely following its nose
when it treats its proper relationship to that question as one of oversight rather than decision.
  322 U.S. 111 (1944).11
  467 U.S. at 843 n. 9.12
  545 U.S. 967 (2005); accord, Long Island Care at home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S.Ct.2339 (2007).13
  533 U.S. 218 (2001).14
  Cf. Kenneth Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Administrative Policymaking. 7115
NYU L. Rev. 1272 (2001); Douglas Geyser, Note, Courts Still Say “What the Law Is”:  Explaining the Functions of the
Judiciary After Brand X, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 2129 (2006).
This proposition is associated with another 1944 opinion, NLRB v. Hearst Publications.11
It is trivial to characterize Chevron’s first step as embodying a generalization of the Hearst approach:
a court will independently decide what authority has been conferred on an agency, now presuming
that in creating an agency with authority to act with the force of law, Congress has delegated to it the
resolution of ostensibly legal questions, to the extent “traditional tools of statutory interpretation”12
do not produce a resolution.
Notice three further propositions, that seem not to be as widely appreciated in the literature as
in my judgment they deserve to be.
• “To the extent” is an important qualification.  Defining the areas of ambiguity within which,
Chevron says, agencies have presumptively the leading oar, is a part of the independent
judicial task, of step one.  In the Hearst situation, to be concrete about it, a court would
properly identify any classes of worker who must be regarded as “employees,” and any
classes of worker who may not permissibly be so regarded.  The NLRB’s authority lay in the
indefinite middle ground of ambiguity, as judicially determined.  Chevron’s language tends
to obscure this point, but later decisions, such as National Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v.
Brand X Internet Services,  make it reasonably clear.13
• As part of its step one determination, a court might well turn to a responsible agency’s
judgment about the matter, as one weight to be considered on the scales the court is using.
That is, Skidmore deference is one of those “traditional tools of statutory interpretation” that
bear on a court’s independent conclusion about the extent of agency authority.
• Suppose a court finds that an agency does have primary decisional responsibility for a matter
that litigation before the court requires the court to decide, but the agency has not yet acted
with the dignity Congress might have expected, when it conferred this authority upon it,
would be appropriate to give an agency’s action law-shaping force.  This was the situation
in, for example, United States v. Mead Corp.,  another much-mooted if somewhat younger14
decision.  If Congress has placed that authority in the agency (again, a matter for independent
judicial judgment), whether or not it has been used, it would seem to follow that – as in
diversity cases – the judicial role is to decide the case, but not to fix the question of meaning
Congress had assigned to another body for force-of-law resolution.  This is the point directly
at issue in National Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services.15
If, then, Chevron step one is the terrain of independent (albeit perhaps influenced) judicial
  Former Chief Judge Harry Edwards of the D.C. Circuit has been particularly vocal in responding to statistical16
demonstrations like these.  E.g. Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151
U.Pa.L.Rev. 1639 (2003).  One can only applaud a general attitude among judges that permission to bring their politics
into the courtroom would destroy the rule-of-law enterprise.  Even if we can be confident that politics’ traces may
inevitably be found in a judge’s work, because she is at the end of the day human, and thus shaped by all that has entered
her consciousness in prior life, this is an element we may expect her to work to suppress, and should hardly wish to
encourage in her conscious performance of task.
  467 U.S. at 843 n. 9.17
   Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001); Gonzales v. Oregon, 543 U.S. 243,18
266 (2006).
judgment, cases resolved at that level have more in common with other judicial judgments about
statutory interpretation than with agency review, as such.  Judges will accept the use of legislative
history or not; will be open to liberal or constrained views of the reach of statutory language; will
tend to focus on purposes or on text; will perhaps be more generous with the work of Republican-
dominated legislatures than Democratic, or vice versa, across the broad range of statutory
interpretation issues.  The politics judges bring to the bench may influence these matters as
Professors Sunstein’s and Miles’ analyses suggest – Republican and Democratic judicial panels may
differ to a statistically significant degree in their attitudes on these matters, and mixed panels may
produce an observable moderation of these tendencies – even as judges conscientiously work to
subdue their politics as they don judicial robes.   16
Yet there is reason to doubt that the set of Chevron opinions, insofar as we are making
observations about step one, is the appropriately bounded set for exploration of this particular
phenomenon, or that the Chevron test (again, to the extent we are talking about step one) is at all
responsible for it.  Beyond its cryptic reference to “traditional tools of statutory
interpretation,” Chevron does not say how the courts are to perform their customary, independent17
role of law-definition.  It only acknowledges a possible outcome of performing that role (the
discovery that primary authority on some particular issue has been assigned to another).  To be sure,
one could suppose as an element of conservative-liberal political differences a differential
willingness to make such a discovery.  But that supposition neither defeats the proposition that
Congress often does make such assignments, nor lays the groundwork for any kind of rule about the
exercise of this sort of independent judicial judgment that could be effective in subduing the political
differences affecting judicial decision.  Indeed, one might think that rule-of-law values, in this
instance, favor the conservative side – favor a disinclination to find a matter within an agency’s
assigned ambit of discretion absent a clear legislative indication that the assignment has been made.
A judge who thinks he ought not “find elephants in mouseholes”  will hold that view whatever18
statutory question he is considering.
B.  Securing Judicial Recognition of Its Subordinate Role
Once one has crossed the bridge to the conclusion that primary authority for a matter has been
placed in agency hands, the judicial role moves from decision to oversight, and Section 706(2) of
the Administrative Procedure Act sets the general standards for performing that role.  For matters
required to be decided in “on the record” proceedings and in other contexts where Congress has used
this verbal formula, agency factual assessments are to be accepted if supported by “substantial
  Pacific States Box & Basket v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935).19
  Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 20
  American Horse Protection Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1987).21
  Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973).22
  401 U.S. 402 (1971).  See Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls Over23
Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1251 (1992) and Peter L. Strauss, Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe – of Politics and Law, Young Lawyers and the Highway Goliath in Peter L. Strauss, ed.,
Administrative Law Stories 258 (2006).  
  401 U.S. 416.24
  401 U.S. 414.25
  401 U.S. 416.26
evidence” in the record as a whole.  For its factual assessments in other kinds of proceedings, and
for its exercises of discretion or judgment, judges are instructed to consider whether the agency
action is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  It
will be evident that these are not mathematically precise formulations.  Indeed one can find in the
cases a range of judicial characterizations what it means to be “arbitrary, capricious,” responding (in
ways the statutory formulation as such does not invite) to the nature of the action under review.
“Arbitrary, capricious” has one meaning for a court reviewing congressional judgments in enacting
legislation,  another for a court reviewing an agency’s decision to adopt a high-consequence19
regulation,  another for a court reviewing an agency’s judgment to forego rulemaking it has been20
petitioned to undertake,  and another for review of the product of informal adjudications in21
relatively low-consequence matters, such as the grant or refusal of permission to open a branch
bank.22
The germinal Supreme Court opinion on this issue is neither Chevron nor State Farm, but the
Supreme Court’s 1971 opinion in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe.   This case involved23
the review of a kind of informal adjudication, the Secretary of Transportation’s decision to subsidize
Tennessee’s construction of a portion of Interstate 40 through an important municipal park, that a
citizen’s group was (successfully) challenging.  The Court’s opinion is notoriously Janus-faced on
the question of review intensity, emphasizing that the judicial role is oversight and not the
substitution of judgment, but both characterizing “the ultimate standard for review [as] a narrow
one,”  and indicating that review is to be “thorough, probing, in-depth”  and “searching and24 25
careful.”   Thus were planted the seeds that became “hard look” and State Farm.  Transparently,26
these formulations, too, are incapable of preventing, if indeed they do not invite, the kinds of
politically driven variation Professors Sunstein and Miles have found.  But before reaching
conclusions about the desirability of formulae that would leave more to agency politics – that is,
loosen judicial controls over delegated authority – it would in my judgment be useful to pay more
attention to statutory and situational variations that their analysis appears to elide.
Review of factual judgments: The APA deploys two different standards for fact review –
“unsupported by substantial evidence ... [considering] the whole record” for proceedings required
  5 U.S.C. 706(2)(E).27
  5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A).28
  Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994)29
  Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999); Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Board of30
Governors of Federal Reserve System, 745 F.2d 677 (D.C. 1984).
  Universal Camera Corp. V. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).31
  IUD v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (DC Cir. 1974).32
  E.g., Executive Order 12866 as amended, 58 FR 51375 (9/30/1973), 67 FR 9385 (2/26/02), 72 FR 276333
(1/18/07), establishing a rigorous system for executive oversight of agency rulemaking, and giving special attention to
rules having a major projected impact on the economy.
to be decided “on the record”  (and other proceedings as Congress may provide) and “arbitrary,27
capricious ... [considering] the whole record.”   Neither is as demanding as the standard that would28
apply to initial proof – normally, a “preponderance of the evidence”; and indeed one consequence
of recognizing Congress’s assignment of responsibility for fact-finding to an agency rather than a
trial court is that neither is as demanding as the standard courts familiarly apply to the factual
judgments of trial courts sitting without a jury, “clearly erroneous.”  But is there, could there be, a
difference between them?
Issues like this are ineffable, invariably giving courts enormous difficulty in giving them content.
On the one hand, courts attach significance to the vanishingly small difference between equipoise
in the record and a preponderance of the evidence, however slight.   On the other, they find it29
challenging to point to cases where, concretely, differing standards would produce differing
outcomes.   One can certainly see that, expressed in percentage-of-the-evidence-that-supports-the-30
outcome terms, the range between what might be arbitrary and capricious in the judgment of
Congress (essentially having no factual support whatever) and a “preponderance of the evidence”
(50+%) leaves about half the field open.  And when directly faced with the challenge of making the
verbal differentiations meaningful, the judicial reaction has been to find in the “substantial evidence”
formulation a congressional direction that review should be more intense.  How much more intense
is of course impossible to say with mathematical precision, but the choice has been taken to reflect
a “mood,” whether made in the context of a Republican legislature’s preferences respecting judicial
review of NLRB decisions  or Congress’s somewhat hesitant permission to the Occupational Safety31
and Health Administration to adopt regulations under generous standards affecting a wide range of
American industry.32
It seems fair to suppose, as well, that courts have been under significant pressure to engage in
more intense review when faced with particularly high-consequence agency decisions – notably,
although perhaps not exclusively, major rulemakings such as EPA and the National Highway and
Transportation Safety Agency (NHTSA, the agency responsible for the State Farm air bags rule)
adopt, that may have consequences rivaling a statute’s for the nation’s economy.  These
considerations have armed the intensity of political oversight;  it would be surprising if they were33
not also responsible for some variation-in-fact in the intensity of judicial review as well.  Reflecting
  R. Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act ch. 10 (1983)34
  Stephen Williams, The Roots of Deference, 100 Yale L. J. 1103, 1108 (1991).35
this very factor, R. Shep Melnick’s work on judicial review of EPA judgments, to which Professors
Sunstein and Miles properly call our attention, reported that EPA experienced different challenges,
different judicial politics, and a narrower range of litigant perspectives, when its adjudicatory
judgments were challenged on review – fines, say, for a regulatory violation – than when its
regulations were.   It is not just that review of regulations can come from a variety of quarters, that34
the agency can be challenged for having done too little as well as too much; it is also that the social
stakes are higher.
Review of discretion and judgment: the “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion” formula
applies not only to factual matters, but to all the stuff that lives in between fact and law – to
judgments about law-application, exercises of discretion, and so forth.  Even for matters subject to
“substantial evidence” review as to factual judgment, where the agency is relying on its experience
to reach judgment this is the “test” that will be applied.  Thus, review of NLRB decisions in unfair
labor practice cases will distinguish between judgments about credibility – where the presiding
officer’s opportunity to hear the witnesses will sharply influence the substantiality of their testimony
on the record as a whole – and judgments about the inferences to be drawn from certain
coincidences, that may embody both the Labor Board’s experience and its views on appropriate labor
law policy.  That an organizer is fired very shortly after his affiliations have come to management
attention permits a secondary inference about management intentions, wholly apart from any
testimony about his violation or not of workplace disciplinary rules; and this secondary inference is
the Board’s business, not the presiding officer’s.  The question will be whether it is “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion.”  So also, respecting the judgments reached in handling the
modeling of air flows when assessing the possible environmental consequences of discharging a
chemical into the atmosphere.
One’s impression is that this last setting – checking disputable scientific or technical judgment
affecting high-consequence issues – has been the domain in which “hard look” has done its most
important work.  The disagreement between majority and concurrence in State Farm offers an
example.  In stating its judgment that seatbelts that could be entered and left without detaching them
(but that were nonetheless detachable) would not significantly increase seatbelt use, the NHTSA
rulemakers omitted the consideration that such seatbelts, once buckled, would remain effective until
unbuckled – that one was not required to unbuckle such a belt to leave one’s seat, and so might not.
While for the concurrers it may have been relevant that there was a new President in office, NHTSA
had not placed its decision in politics but in science and, as a Republican appointee to the DC Circuit
plangently observed, it was that which made the science “the vulnerable point.”   35
One may suggest, further, that political controls are most virtuous when exercised as such, and
not by bending science.  An agency official who was an early enthusiast for “hard look” observed
in oft-quoted passages
"... [D]etailed factual review of [EPA] regulations by those with the power to change them
takes place in two forums only - at the level of the office of primary interest and working
group inside EPA, and in court.  The working group generally will understand the technical
  W ILLIAM F. PEDERSEN , JR., FORM AL RECORDS AND INFORM AL RULEM AKING, 85 Yale L.J. 38, 59-60 (1975)36
(emphasis supplied).
complexities of a regulation.  So to a great extent will members of the industry being
regulated. But the review process within the agency and the executive branch does not spur
a working group to make sure that the final regulation adequately reflects these complexities.
To the extent that internal review is the only review worried about, comments by the affected
industry or (to pick a less frequent case) by environmental groups may not be given the kind
of detailed consideration they deserve.  Since the higher levels of review are unwilling or
unable to consider the more complex issues, the best hope for detailed, effective review of
complex regulations is the judiciary.
"It is a great tonic to discover that even if a regulation can be slipped or wrestled through
various layers of internal or external review [inside the bureaucracy] without significant
change, the final and most prestigious reviewing forum of all - a circuit court of appeals -
will inquire into the minute details of methodology, data sufficiency and test procedure and
will send the regulations back if these are lacking.  The effect of such judicial opinions
within the agency reaches beyond those who were concerned with the specific regulations
reviewed.  They serve as a precedent for future rulewriters and give those who care about
well-documented and well-reasoned decisionmaking a lever with which to move those who
do not."”36
While judicial politics may, as Sunstein and Miles suggest, influence the precise outcomes of these
explorations – in ways agency officials, not knowing the composition of the appellate panels they
may eventually face, dare not try to predict – the impact thus reported is to support science against
politics.  And for high-consequence rulemakings, the kind already also being significantly impacted
(ossified?) by congressionally-endorsed processes of OMB review widely suspected to be implicated
in some science-bending, it is hard to think such a “hard look” impact untoward.
II.  Review Variation and the Sunstein-Miles Study
The Miles-Sunstein studies indicate, as we might have expected, both that judicial outcomes are
somewhat affected by judges’ political orientations, and – more important – that when judges of
differing political orientation sit together, this effect is moderated.  Could one imagine resulting
legislation requiring three-judge court of appeals panels to be composed, not at random, but – to the
extent feasible – as mixtures of judges who had been appointed by different Presidents, perhaps even
by Presidents of different parties?  Although there is some support for such a judgment in the
common congressional practice of requiring bipartisan membership in independent regulatory
commissions, such a measure might appear to be endorsing the proposition that politics plays a
legitimate role on judicial review.  That endorsement might cost more in its impacts on judicial and
public conceptions of judges’ roles than any possible benefit it could deliver.  Putting this to one
side, however, it is hard to accept that these studies support adoption of agency review standards
different from those now deployed.
The discussion so far has suggested that in analyzing Chevron decisions, step one decisions
should be pooled with other cases involving direct judicial statutory interpretation, and not with
Chevron step two decisions.  There’s little reason to expect a different empirical result, but reframing
  Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1253 (1997).37
  To repeat, in my judgment to say that the agency is acting outside the area of discretion that has been38
statutorily committed to its charge is a judgment at Step One, not Step Two.
  Cf. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 198939
  E.g., 42 U.S.C. 7607.40
the issue that way would focus our attention on the cause (political differences among judges) and
not on a particular symptom.  Here, I want to suggest a variety of other distractions, to the same end.
Chevron step two and State Farm issues are both decided under APA §706(2)(A).   The Chevron37
step two issue is whether the agency’s judgment, on a matter within what the reviewing court has
found to be the agency’s delegated authority, is “reasonable.”   That is to say, translating this into38
the APA’s terms governing the standards for review, it is a matter respecting which the court’s
responsibility, under §706(2)(A), is to say whether it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion.”   This is the identical language as underlay State Farm.  One might argue, perhaps, that
some issues regularly associated with Chevron “Step two” – whether or not to adopt a bubble policy
– will have less factual content and more simple political preference content – than those regularly
associated with State Farm.  How one assesses what is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion”
does vary with context.  Still, “the President told me to do it” will not count as a “reasonable” basis
for action under §706(2)(A) unless the statute makes that a dispositive factor; the agency must have
reasons that satisfy its statutory charge.  And courts have no authority to vary the directive of §706.39
To the extent one is looking for a Section 706(2)(A) data set, which is what the Miles-Sunstein study
appears to be about, then, that set arguably should include both step two and “hard look” cases.
Not all EPA cases may address the same issue.  The authors appear to have lumped EPA
adjudications with EPA rules, perhaps because the relatively small number of EPA rules will make
it hard to achieve statistically significant results.  But as indicated, the literature specifically looking
at these two sets – years ago to be sure, and more impressionistically – found striking differences in
judicial review performance between them.  Intuitively this seems just what one would expect.
Socially, adjudications are lower consequence events; they are less open to review “from all sides”;
and they are more likely to turn on particular facts, not science or engineering judgment.  Very often
the significant review will be “substantial evidence” review, not §706(2)(A) review.  By statute,40
the difficult judgmental questions underlying the agency’s rulemaking judgments are often precluded
from attack except on review of the rule, promptly following it adoption.  “Hard look” may not be
at issue. 
NLRB cases, predominantly, and State Farm cases do not address the same issue.  The data set
the authors use is dominated, 12:1, by NLRB cases, yet in my judgment these are apples to State
Farm oranges.
• NLRB cases result from on-the-record adjudications respecting particular disputed incidents.
They are subject to “substantial evidence” review much more than 706(2)(A) “arbitrary
capricious” review.  Incident facts, and not hard scientific or technical judgments, are at their
heart.  The authors do not mention, and it seems highly dubious, that State Farm’s “hard
look” plays any role in these cases, which do not involve the kinds of considerations or
  Cox, Bok, Gorman & Finkin, Labor Law 12  ed. 1996 at 108.th41
  James L. Brudney, A FAMOUS VICTORY: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROTECTIONS AND THE42
STATUTORY AGING PROCESS, 74 NC L Rev 939, 944 (1996).
   Brudney, op. cit. supra.43
  Cox et al. at 108.44
judgments that animated State Farm and its predecessors in the D.C. Circuit.  A prominent
Labor Law casebook, in its 1996 edition,  mentions Chevron as having possibly complicated
judicial review for the NLRB, but not State Farm.41
• One readily supposes that a study of NLRB cases from any decade following the Universal
Camera decision would show variations like those Professors Sunstein and Miles have
found, particularly as it became clear to the courts of appeal that their judgments on these
issues were more unlikely than most to see Supreme Court review.   Absent a marked shift42
in these variations in the years following 1984, and absent any indication reviewing courts
regularly thought State Farm a part of their repertoire, NLRB cases should not be taken as
speaking to the impact of that case’s construction of “arbitrary, capricious.”
• Other empirical work, using over 1200 NLRB review cases from the period 1986-93, has
demonstrated strong variations in outcome depending on the particular issues involved.   A43
leading Labor Law casebook reported at about the same time tremendous variation on a
geographic basis – for example, the 8  Circuit fully affirming NLRB cases at  barely half theth
rate (42%) of the Ninth (81%) in fiscal 1994.   Such variations have their own possible44
groundings in political view; labor unions are more popular/less contested in some parts of
the country than others.  But they have no demonstrable connection to contemporary
understandings of “arbitrary, capricious.”
• NLRB judgments are not self-enforcing.  Although most often accepted – indeed, not taken
to the point even of formal Board judgment – the consequence is that the Board must
affirmatively seek their enforcement if it doubts voluntary compliance will occur.  EPA rules
must be promptly challenged, or else take effect.  EPA adjudication products (licenses and
fines) may take effect if not affirmatively made the subject of review.  These differences,
reflecting inter alia political judgments by Congress, could have differential outcome effects
Conclusion
The authors’ point appears to be to urge a change in the State Farm review standard.  Since (they
have shown) judicial judgments will be shaped to some degree by political orientation, wouldn’t it
be preferable to leave control to the politicians of the current administration, rather than holdovers
from prior ones?  Shouldn’t Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence have prevailed?
Changing the State Farm standard will have no impact on the cases to which it is not applied.
That set (i.e., NLRB cases) appears to constitute the overwhelming proportion of the database
Professors Sunstein and Miles have used.  One may confidently predict a continued capacity to
  W ILLIAM  F. PEDERSEN , JR., FORM AL RECORDS AND INFORM AL RULEM AKING, 85 Yale L.J. 38, 60 (1975)45
(emphasis supplied).
  Thomas McGarity and Wendy Wagner, Bending Science (forthcoming Spring 2008, Harvard University46
Press; manuscript with author) [if you don’t like this, http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,12271,1151187,00.html will
give you a way of constructing something more concrete.]
demonstrate politics-driven differences in outcome on review of NLRB adjudications, whatever
review standard is deployed.  We may hope, I do hope, that the “tenacity of a taught tradition,” the
understanding that results must be justified in the terms that the law allows (which do not include
political preferences), will constrain these differences, as I believe they do today.  But it would be
bootless to think we could eliminate them.  And we certainly would not affect them by altering a
standard that is rarely if ever relevant to their determination.
Let us assume – it is almost certainly the case – that the general result Professors Sunstein and
Miles have found holds in all settings in which a judge’s political view intersects with some matter
in the case before her.  Again, though, in my judgment one needs to understand the extent to which
that is a constrained result, one limited by the tenacity of the taught tradition and the understanding
that results must be justified in the terms that the law allows (which do not include political
preferences).  And one ought to be concerned that recognition of this fact may make judging the
more, not less, political.  When turning to the impact of changing the State Farm standard for those
cases in which it is regularly deployed, especially high-consequence rulemakings turning to a
significant degree on disputable judgments about scientific, technological or like questions, shouldn’t
one seek some indication whether the judicial politicization problem is worse in this context than
in others?  If I have correctly suggested significant problems with the data set they have used, their
analysis does not show this; nor is one’s intuition that this should prove to be true.  
In addition one would like to have seen more attention paid to the gains “hard look” might bring
for “rational” decision-making in the highly freighted and significant contexts to which it seems most
important.  Within the agency, an EPA official wrote, hard look review “reaches beyond those who
were concerned with the specific regulations reviewed.  They serve as a precedent for future
rulewriters and give those who care about well-documented and well-reasoned decisionmaking a
lever with which to move those who do not.”  “Those who do not,” we have certainly learned,45
include politicians inside and outside the agency who care about results and not about science.46
Since agency officials cannot know who their judicial reviewers will be, they can have no incentive
to bend their science to particular supposed tastes.  The knowledge that there will be review, looked
at hard in the context of these difficult judgments, endows “those who care about well-documented
and well-reasoned decisionmaking a lever with which to move those who do not."  Why, in this
context, should we wish to give that lever up?
